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As demand and consumption of natural gas increases, so will drilling
operations to extract the natural gas on federal public lands. Fueled by
the shale gas revolution, natural gas drilling operations are now
frequently taking place, not only in the highly documented urban settings,
but also on federal public lands with high conservation value. The
phenomenon of increased drilling in sensitive locations, both urban and
remote, has sparked increased public opposition, requiring oil and gas
producers to reconsider how they engage the public. Oil and gas
producers have increasingly deployed the concept of a social license to
operate to gain support from the public and the communities in which they
operate. A social license to operate is a voluntary license granted by
communities, obligating companies to go above and beyond the
requirements of their legal license to operate. While natural gas
developers have increasingly sought to achieve a social license to operate
in urban settings, such as the Colorado Front Range, there has been little
use of this approach by operators drilling on federal public land. We
advocate for the use of increased collaboration with affected stakeholders
and communities through the NEPA process as a means to achieve a social
license to operate on federal public land.
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“The broadest paradox of the fracking debate lies in the allocation of
costs and benefits. The local communities in proximity to the
development experience the disturbances with immediacy and intensity.
The principal benefits - national security, a cleaner-burning fossil fuel,
heated homes, generated electricity, and profits to company owners and
stockholders - are received in distant locals. This is an arrangement set
up to maximize distrust and misunderstanding.”1

1.
Patty Limerick, The Fractured Terrain of Oil and Gas Opposition,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 22, 2016 (hereinafter “The Fractured Terrain”).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2013 the authors conducted a study in Routt and Moffat
Counties in northern Colorado at the request of the Shell Exploration and
Production Company (Shell) to explore local stakeholder perceptions
regarding oil and gas development.2 The study involved interviews with
representatives from various stakeholder groups, providing quantitative
and qualitative data to explore the themes in the community discourse
surrounding energy production in the region.3 We found five themes that
defined the discourse, and not surprisingly, they ranged from very trusting
to very distrusting of oil and gas companies and regulators.4 An important
finding was that study participants were able to articulate a set of
environmental, economic, and social conditions under which they would
accept expanded oil and gas development in the area.5
This study illuminated the place-based aspirations and concerns
that would have been raised if Shell had decided to expand its oil and gas
operations in the area (which it did not). It also appeared that most
conditions articulated by stakeholders were negotiable for Shell, and that
most stakeholders were willing to negotiate with Shell.6 Had Shell
continued with its proposed development, there would have been potential
to use place-based collaborative approaches to optimize profits for the
company while creating a social license to operate with the stakeholders
and communities. A social license to operate is society’s or a local
community’s acceptance or approval of a company's activities or
operations.7

2.
Jessica M. Clement & Elizabeth Spaulding, The Prevailing Themes
in the Oil and Gas Development Discourse Among Local Residents in Moffat and
Routt Counties, Colorado, 1 (2013), on file with Ruckelshaus Institute, University of
Wyoming.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Brian F. Yates & Celesa L. Horvath, Social License to Operate:
How to Get it, and How to Keep it 1, Pacific Energy Summit (Summit Working Papers,
2013), available at: http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/eta/PES_2013_summitpaper
_Yates_Horvath.pdf.
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When Shell sold its interests in the area, the authors continued to
explore the extent to which collaborative approaches are used in oil and
gas development in general, and in the United States specifically. We met
with executives at Shell and the International Petroleum Industry
Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) to discuss
collaboration and a social license to operate. We also convened an Energy
and Collaboration Summit, where we invited a panel of current and former
energy executives to Jackson, Wyoming for a facilitated discussion on
current practices and challenges related to collaborative decision making.8
During the discussion, we explored opportunities for new approaches to
enhancing the achievement of a social license to operate in the energy
sector in the western United States, particularly on public lands.9
The Shell study, the discussions with Shell and IPIECA, and the
Energy and Collaboration Summit helped us understand that there are
incentives and disincentives for companies to engage and collaborate with
stakeholders and communities in order to seek a social license to operate.
In the context of public lands, many of those incentives and disincentives
are built into the federal regulatory process, and specifically into the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process. Given that a typical
oil and gas NEPA Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) takes an average
of 4.4 years to complete, there has been understandable frustration with
the time and expense of NEPA compliance, leading to calls for NEPA
reform and/or streamlining the process.10 However, if a streamlined
process results in litigation and a supplemental EIS is judicially ordered,
an additional average of 2.3 years is added to the EIS completion timeline,
adding additional expense and frustration.11 If the NEPA process is
streamlined, collaborative approaches to NEPA will be necessary to
reduce the likelihood of litigation-driven EIS delay.12
While the previous literature on the emergence of a social license
to operate in the United States has focused on private oil and gas
8.
Energy & Collaboration Summit, Jackson, Wyoming, (Mar. 6,
2014) (unpublished conference report; on file with the author).
9.
Id.
10.
John Ruple & Mark Capone, NEPA - Substantive Effectiveness
Under a Procedural Mandate: Assessment of Oil and Gas EISs in the Mountain West,
7 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 39, 45 (2016).
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
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developments, we are particularly interested in its application to federal
public land oil and gas development projects as a means to reduce conflict
and add value to all parties. In this article, we propose that NEPA provides
a unique opportunity to incorporate greater collaboration into oil and gas
projects in order to achieve a social license to operate. That unique
opportunity exists because unlike development on private land, complying
with NEPA requirements for oil and gas production on public lands
provides companies with a defined structure from which to engage
communities and stakeholders through a collaborative process. We begin
in Section II by providing an overview of social license to operate
including the emergence of its application in the U.S. oil and gas sector by
discussing two case studies. In Section III we discuss how collaborative
processes are synonymous with social license “ingredients.” In Section
IV we discuss NEPA and how greater collaborative efforts can be
incorporated into the NEPA process to achieve a social license. In Section
V we discuss how to overcome barriers to collaboration in the NEPA
process, specifically overcoming the hurdles posed by the Federal
Advisory Committee Act. In Section VI we conclude by suggesting that
by encouraging federal land agency personnel to incorporate more
collaboration into the NEPA process, a variety of federal land project
proponents (including coal, renewable, and timber) can leverage the legal
license process to achieve a social license to operate.
II. SOCIAL LICENSE BACKGROUND
As noted above, a social license to operate generally confers
community acceptance of a company’s operations and outlines “the
demands on and expectations for a business enterprise that emerge from
neighborhoods, environmental groups, community members, and other
elements of the surrounding civil society.”13 A social license to operate is
generally voluntary, often informal, and is granted by a community based
on the opinions and views of stakeholders.

13.
Neil Gunningham, et. al., Social License and Environmental
Protection: Why Businesses go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307,
308 (2004), http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/675/.
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The term social license was first used during a 1997 World Bank
meeting by Jim Cooney, a Canadian mining executive, who described the
ability of communities to stop a mining project.14 The term was revisited
and further developed in response to the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2006, requiring extractive industries
operating in the territories of indigenous people to secure free, prior, and
informed consent (FPIC) from those indigenous communities.15
While originally only applied in the mining sector, a social license
to operate has begun to be applied to other energy sectors as well. A social
license is a particularly powerful tool in the energy sector where it can be
used as leverage against the demands of environmental advocacy groups,
who act as watchdogs and de facto regulators.16 A few damaging
encounters involving large energy corporations, environmental advocacy
groups, and the public has “led to a broader corporate rethink” and more
frequent application of a social license to operate in the energy sector.17
One such damaging encounter was Shell’s mid-1990’s miscalculation that
the public would not object to the sinking of the Brent Spar, a 14,500 ton
oil platform in the North Sea, because the necessary approvals from the
UK government had been obtained.18 Much to Shell’s surprise, public
opposition was significant, and protests against Shell were waged across
Europe.19 Shell’s international reputation was substantially damaged and

14.
Joel Gehman, Lianne M. Lefsrud, & Stewart Fast, Social License
to Operate: Legitimacy by Another Name? 60 NEW FRONTIERS, 293, 294 (2017)
(explaining that usage of the term social license to operate became widespread
throughout the mining industry in 2002 but offering that the term is not a new concept
and has long been understood “to play a vital function in society whereby social norms
can precede and superseded legal rules.”). Jim Cooney, Reflections on the 20th
Anniversary of the Term ‘Social License,’ 35 J. Energy & Nat. Resources L.197 (2017)
(offering his personal account of how his use of ‘social license” occurred at the 1997
World Bank meeting).
15.
Kathleen M. Wilburn & Ralph Wilburn, Achieving Social License
to Operate Using Stakeholder Theory, 4 J. OF INT’L BUS. ETHICS, 3, 4 (2011).
16.
Gunningham, supra note 13, at 337.
17.
Id. at 309.
18.
Id.
19.
Jesper Grolin, Corporate Legitimacy in Risk Society: The Case of
Brent Spar, 7 BUS. STRATEGY AND THE ENV’T, 213, 214 (1998).
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its sales were significantly impacted.20 In the end, Shell decided to
dismantle and recycle the Brent Spar platform on land.21 Had a greater
community outreach been undertaken, and a social license obtained in
addition to governmental approval, perhaps Shell would not have taken
such a hard hit.
In his book, The Social License: How to Keep your Organization
Legitimate, John Morrison notes that fifty years ago
the resource [extraction] sector secured its license to
operate at the discretion of the government, in fact, we
still do. And that’s called a legal license and permits and
license are granted and we live up to the expectation and
they are maintained. But in the world of globalization and
in an increasing world of scrutiny and mobilization of
local voices, if you don't have the broad-based support of
local people for what you want to do, then you won’t get
your legal license.22
Understanding that negative community impacts can “damage a
company’s reputation, or result in loss of operation time and profits, and
can put future investment opportunities at risk” major oil and gas
extraction companies and their investors are increasingly recognizing that
securing a social license to operate is a precondition to development.”23
The process of obtaining a social license includes early and
ongoing communication with communities, transparency and engagement
in decision-making, and the establishment of effective conflict resolution
mechanisms.24 At its core, a social license to operate involves a significant
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 215.
JOHN MORRISON, THE SOCIAL LICENSE: HOW TO KEEP YOUR
ORGANIZATION LEGITIMATE, 159 (2014).
23.
Emma Wilson, What is the Social License to Operate? Local
Perceptions of Oil and Gas Projects in Russia’s Komi Republic and Sakhalin Island,
3 THE EXTRACTIVE INDUS. AND SOC’Y, 73, 73 (2016).
24.
Don C. Smith, Jessica Richards, & R.J. Colwell, Where “Shale”
We Go From Here: Opportunities and Challenges in Shale Plays Located Outside the
United States, 14-2 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. FDN. 14, 14-4 (2017) referencing Jason Prno
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degree of meaningful dialogue between a company and the community in
the planning and operation of the industrial activity. In that vein, a grant
of a social license to operate by the public requires that the public
understand what it is granting.25 Complete and accurate public disclosure
of the relevant information needed to fully evaluate the proposed
development must be disclosed to the public so they can gain a shared
understanding of the risks and benefits of the energy development project.
That disclosure should include conversations about what is known, and
what is not known, utilizing credible, sciences-based background
information to inform the debate so that all sides can engage in a
discussion based on facts, not opinions.26
Once obtained, a social license is dynamic; its grant is
impermanent and can be revoked when public perceptions and opinions
change.27 Pierre Lassonde, one of the most famous gold investors in the
world, remarked during a speech to the Melbourne Mining Club in 2003,
that a “social license to operate, much like a reputation, is first and
foremost built on trust, which takes years to build, but can be lost in
seconds.”28 A social license is most commonly revoked based on
“perceived risk or lack of benefits to stakeholders.”29
A. A Social License to Operate vs. a Legal License to Operate
A social license to operate is not a legal license to operate, as it is
not based on legal requirements, but rather on the degree to which a
& D. Scott Slocombe, Exploring the Origins of “Social License to Operate” in the
Mining Sector: Perspectives from Governance and Sustainability Theories, 37 RES.
POL’Y 346, 347 (2012).
25.
Evan House, Fractured Fairytales: The Failed Social License for
Unconventional Oil and Gas, 13 WYO. L. REV. 5, 54 (2013).
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 51.
28.
Pierre Lassonde, What Shade of Green are You?, Melbourne
Mining Club, 5 (Aug. 8, 2003) available at: http://www.melbourneminingclub.com/
wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ Pierre-Lassonde-8-August-2003.pdf
29.
Elizabeth Holly & Clark Mitcham, The Pebble Mine Dialogue: A
Case Study in Public Engagement and the Social License to Operate, 47 RES. POL’Y,
18 (2016) (citing R.G. Boutilier, Frequently Asked Questions About the Social License
to Operate, 32 Impact Assess. Proj. Apprais, 263-272 (2014)).
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company and its activities meet the expectations of local communities, the
wider society, and various constituent groups.30 A legal license to operate
on the other hand, is granted by a government body and includes the initial
permission to do something, as well as ongoing compliance with existing
applicable laws and regulations.31 However, a legal license to operate and
a social license to operate are not completely distinct; instead, they
necessarily complement and reinforce one another.32 However, a legal
license framework must necessarily exist before a social license can be
contemplated because a social license is an extension of a legal license.33
As applied to the oil and gas industry, the legal license sets the
formal framework for the energy company to obtain the right to use the
land and/or extract the natural resources in exchange for compliance with
environmental rules and regulations.34 To the extent that the legal license
does not encapsulate society’s expectations, in places where exploration
and production activities are controversial and disputed, oil and gas
companies need to rely upon a social license to operate. In this context, a
social license “describes the latitudes or freedom that society allows the
business to use land and its resources without interference. Society expects
more of businesses than that they just comply with the law.”35
Traditionally, corporations viewed compliance with governmental
legislation as fulfilling both their legal requirements and their social
obligations since governmental legislation was understood to be a measure
of societal expectations.36 Corporations were expected to go above and
beyond compliance with legislation only if there was some financial self-

30.
Gunningham, supra note 13, at 308.
31.
Smith, Richards, & Colwell, supra note 24, at 14-3.
32.
Id. at 14-2.
33.
Id. at 14-4.
34.
Brian J. Preston, The Adequacy of the Law in Satisfying Society’s
Expectations for Major Projects, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL
CONFERENCE PAPER, 2 (Oct. 22, 2014).
35.
Id.
36.
Gunningham, supra note 13, at 308 (citing M. Wright, Factors
Motivating Proactive Health and Safety Management, Contract Research Report
prepared by Entec. U.K. Ltd. For the Health and Safety Executive London, Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office (1998)).
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interest for doing so.37 That has changed. Today, corporations understand
that social obligations are no longer synonymous with legal obligations.38
Instead, corporations now understand that hazards and harms that are not
per se illegal today, may become so in the future leaving them open to both
social and legal liability.39
In reality, the demands by social licensors may be tougher than
the demands imposed by legal license regulators.40 Many companies fear
enforcement for noncompliance with a legal license not for the penalty
associated with it, but because enforcement actions generate negative
publicity, impacting the company’s reputation and perhaps its social
license.41 It is also likely that failure to satisfy a social concern or establish
a social license may result in tighter regulatory restrictions.42
There are, however, limits on how far beyond compliance with a
legal license companies are willing to go to satisfy a social license to
operate.43 Constraints or limits on the social license to operate include
economic constraints, the reasonableness of the social licensors’ demands,
and the responsiveness of legal and political actors to enforce the social
licensors’ demands.44 Ultimately, the impact on a company’s economic
bottom line is the key factor in determining how far beyond legal
compliance a company will be willing to go.45

37.
Id. As an example, Gunningham noted that in the case of
environmental protection, it was often more cost effective to reduce waste so
corporations did so. However, over time the environment continued to be degraded so
it was obvious the financial self-interest for reducing waste was not prevalent enough,
thus there was a political demand for increased governmental regulation (legal
coercion) to compel corporate environmental measures.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Smith, Richards, & Colwell, supra note 24, at 14-3 to 14-4.
41.
Id. at 14-4.
42.
Gunningham, supra note 13, at 331.
43.
Id. at 332.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. at 336.
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B. The Emergence of Social License Application in the United States Oil
and Natural Gas Sector; Two Case Studies
While first applied in the oil and gas industry in the 20th century
in the developing world, the developed world did not apply social license
to operate until the 2010’s, coinciding with the advent of unconventional
oil and gas development.46 Sparked by drilling technology advances,
unconventional gas development, or the “shale gas revolution,” has
resulted in a dramatic increase in natural gas production in the United
States.47 New drilling and extraction technologies have enabled drilling
operations to occur in more sensitive locations such as urban areas and on
public lands with high conservation value.48 Drilling in sensitive locations
has sparked public and community opposition requiring natural gas
developers to reconsider how they engage the public.49 On this point, Alex
Hohmann, a former manager of stakeholder relations for Anadarko has
commented that the major reason fuel projects go undeveloped “is not for
lack of a legal license, but for lack of growing, earning and maintaining a
social license.”50
Despite its emergence, the adoption of social license practices has
been slow to catch on in the natural gas context, resulting in limited
examples to draw from, particularly in the federal public land context. 51
We have selected two case studies to highlight the emerging application
of a social license to operate in the U.S. oil and gas sector. The first case
46.
Don C. Smith & Jessica M. Richards, Social License to Operate:
Hydraulic Fracturing-Related Challenges Facing the Oil & Gas Industry, 1 OIL &
GAS, NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J., 91, 97 (2015).
47.
Monika Ehrman, The Next Great Compromise: A Comprehensive
Response to Opposition Against Shale Gas Development Using Hydraulic Fracturing
in the United States, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 423, 425 (2014).
48.
See Aldo Svaldi, Drilling and Development are on a Collision
Course in Northeastern Colorado, The Denver Post, Aug. 7, 2017; Brittany Patterson,
Can Zinke Squeeze More Oil From Public Lands?, E&E News, July, 7 2017.
49.
Smith & Richards, supra note 46, at 84.
50.
Id. at 117 (citing interview by Stephanie Joyce with Alex
Hohmann, Stakeholder Relations Manager for Anadarko Petroleum, In Relationships
101: Oil and Gas Looks for a Social License to Operate, WYOMING PUBLIC
RADIO (Dec. 5, 2014), available at https://insideenergy.org/2014/12/05/
relationships-101-oil-and-gas-look-for-a-social-license-to-operate/.)
51.
Id. at 102.
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study involves the utilization of memorandums of understanding (MOUs)
to achieve a social license to address the deep tension involving the
expansion of shale development on private land in and around expanding
suburban development on Colorado's Front Range. The second case study
involves the utilization of a formal negotiation process, as well as a
bilateral private negotiation process, to achieve a social license to operate
and develop a natural gas field on sensitive federal public lands in the Nine
Mile Canyon-West Tavaputs Plateau area in Utah.
From the case studies we can draw two conclusions: (1) there
exists an opportunity to add value to all parties when a social license to
operate is achieved; and (2) while there appeared to be elements of
cooperation among the parties in both case studies, the utilization of a
purposive, principled collaborative process presents an opportunity to
develop an even stronger social license to operate.
C. Urban Private Land Case Study –Shale Gas Development on the
Colorado Front Range
Oil and gas development is not new to Colorado’s Front Range,
in fact, even the progressive community of Boulder, Colorado had an
active oil field in its midst in the early 20th century.52 While oil and gas
development has existed on the Front Range since the 1900s, the fracking
boom of the 2000s brought oil and gas development into the backyards of
simultaneously expanding Front Range communities and suburbs.53 As a
result, Colorado has found itself front and center in the public debate over
regulation of hydraulic fracturing.54 Patty Limerick, University of
Colorado history professor and director of the Center for the American
52.
Patty Limerick, The Fractured Terrain of Oil and Gas Opposition,
High Country News, Feb. 22, 2016); See also Lucas Satterlee, Clearing the Fog: A
Historical Analysis of Environmental and Energy Law in Colorado, 28 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 11 (2017) (describing the early energy production efforts in Colorado including
a coal mine that began operations near Boulder, CO in 1859).
53.
Austin Shaffer, Skylar Zillox, & Jessica Smith, Memorandum of
Understanding And the Social License to Operate in Colorado’s Unconventional
Energy Industry: A Study of Citizen Complaints, 35 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. L., 69, 6970 (2016).
54.
Id. at 70.
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West, captured the sentiment of the conflict with this insightful comment:
“the boom of activity in the planet's underworld has brought to the surface
not only an abundance of hydrocarbons, but a deep reservoir of buried
political and social tension.” 55
The pace and extent of the Front Range hydraulic fracturing boom
alarmed many communities leading to passage of local government
moratoria, bans on hydraulic fracturing, and proposed ballot measures
restricting the use of hydraulic fracturing statewide.56 The local
government bans and moratoria were eventually found to be invalid and
unenforceable by the Colorado Supreme Court.57 Shortly thereafter, there
were referendum attempts to place measures on the Colorado ballot that
would restrict hydraulic fracturing statewide.58 One of the proposed ballot
measures would have prohibited oil and gas facilities from operating
within 2,500 feet of homes or other occupied buildings, and another would
have given more power to local governments to restrict fracking.59 Both
proposals failed for lack of sufficient signatures.60 Despite the setbacks,

55.
Limerick, supra note 52. In her article The fractured terrain of oil
and gas opposition, Patty Limerick notes that this division into “two clearly defined
and rigidly opposed cohorts” does not take into account the layers of complexity
involved in the Front Range hydraulic fracturing debate. Limerick, supra note 52.
That complexity comes from a number of sources including: (1) the “inaudible
population” that represents the middle, (2) the factors of class, race and ethnicity that
“converge in second concealed layer”, (3) a recognition that companies come in all
different sizes and include principal players and subcontractors, (4) and that the term
“opponents” can include everyone from a neighboring resident to an oil and gas
wellsite to national environmental activists. Id.
56.
See Shaffer et al., supra note 53, at 70 (hereinafter Shaffer).
57.
City of Fort Collins v. Colorado Oil, 369 P.3d 586 (Colo. 2016)
(the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that Fort Collin’s five-year moratorium on
fracking and storage of fracking waste within the city to be preempted by state law
and therefore invalid and unenforceable); City of Longmont v. Colorado Oil and Gas,
369 P.3d 573 (Colo. 2016) (The Colorado Supreme Court found the City of
Longmont’s ban on fracking and the storage and disposal of fracking wastes within its
city limits to be preempted by state law and therefore invalid and unenforceable).
58.
Mark K. Matthew & Joey Bunch, Colorado Anti-Fracking
Measures Fail to Make Ballot; Possible Forgery Alleged, Denv. Post, Aug. 29, 2016.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
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Front Range communities have continued to pass short-term moratoriums
while they consider new regulations.61
In the midst of the ongoing conflict, oil and gas operators continue
to drill in and adjacent to expanding communities along the Front Range.
Many of those companies, wary of the “deep reservoir of buried political
and social tension,”62 initiated efforts to achieve a social license from the
Front Range communities in which they operate. One of the tools used by
the oil and gas companies to achieve a social license along the Front Range
is the development of MOUs with impacted communities.63
One of the first such efforts was an MOU between Erie, Colorado,
and two oil and gas companies developing in and around Erie.64 At the
time the MOU was negotiated, Erie had in place a drilling moratorium
suspending oil and gas development within its jurisdiction until studies on
air quality were conducted and the town could develop a method to work
with oil and gas companies.65 During the moratorium, the town of Erie
and the two oil and gas companies negotiated and signed an MOU.66 The
signed MOU requires the oil and gas companies to attach a list of best
practices, negotiated with Erie, to their drilling permits submitted to the
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission.67 After the MOU was
signed, Erie lifted its moratorium and oil and gas activity in the area
resumed.68
In this instance, the two oil and gas companies were able to
successfully achieve a social license through the process of negotiating
and implementing an MOU that required them to employ communitynegotiated best practices. The grant of a social license from the
community resulted in the drilling moratorium being lifted with almost
61.
The Associated Press, Lafayette Warned Against Oil, Gas Drilling
Moratorium, The Denv. Post, Sept. 30, 2017.
62.
Limerick, supra note 52.
63.
See Univ. of Colorado, Database of MOUs, Oilandgasbmps.org,
http://www.oilandgasbmps.org/resources/MOU-databases.php (last visited (April 18,
2018). This database allows users to access the MOUs and to compare the best
management practices contained within them.
64.
Shaffer, supra note 53, at 70.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
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non-existent public comment and criticism.69 In this case study, litigation
that would eventually befall other Front Range communities who enacted
drilling moratoriums and bans was avoided, reducing conflict and saving
time and money.70 What we do not know is how collaborative the MOU
negotiation process was. It is not clear whether City of Erie officials
engaged one-on-one with community members to develop the list of best
practices that accompanied the MOU. We can only surmise that city
officials established sufficient levels of legitimacy, credibility, and trust
among concerned Erie residents that not only earned the city a social
license to negotiate on their behalf, but bestowed a social license to the oil
and gas companies to operate.
Researchers from the Colorado School of Mine’s Center for a
Sustainable West have recently published two papers analyzing the impact
of these types of MOUs on public opinion and citizen complaints.71 They
found that MOUs can help shape community participation in the
governance of oil and gas activity, namely by focusing community
complaints to specific issues.72 This is likely because the MOU improves
environmental performance, or there is at least a perception that it does.73
The researchers also found that drilling encroachment was the strongest
factor leading to complaints against oil and gas development.74
Specifically, the proximity of wells to residential locations, not the rate of
drilling activity, was the greatest predictor of the volume of complaints. 75
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
See Skylar Zilliox & Jessica M. Smith, Supraregulatory
Agreements and Unconventional Energy Development: Learning from Citizen
Concerns, Enforceability and Participation in Colorado, 4 THE EXTRACTIVE INDUS.
AND SOC’Y 69 (2017); Shaffer, supra note 53, at 69.
72.
Shaffer, supra note 53, at 84.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. The Researchers at the Colorado School of Mines found that
noise was the leading cause for complaint among those impacted by suburban oil and
gas development. Id. This led them to suggest that suburbanites affected by oil and
gas activity are more interested in coexisting with industrial activity (i.e. they would
like the noise to be reduced, but are agreeable with the other aspects of the activity).
Id. This is in contrast to rural populations who have more strongly opposed oil and
gas activity on the grounds that it changes people’s relationship with the land. Id.
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Ultimately, they concluded that the MOUs provided an opportunity for
energy companies and communities to reconcile their expectations,
generate a learning process about the energy industry, and the MOUs
provide a mechanism for energy companies to listen to the communities
closest to their operations.76 In the researcher’s opinion, the link that the
MOUs provide between the energy companies and communities “allows
for oil and gas operations to run more smoothly, with complaints being
pointed toward issues that are not already being addressed by oil and gas
companies.”77
This case study reveals that by engaging in a MOU negotiation
process, both the oil and gas companies and the communities were able to
gain more value than they would have without the process. The value
gained by the companies was the lifting of the community drilling
moratorium, and the value gained by the communities was the
implementation of negotiated best practices that reduced the impact to the
community from the oil and gas development. Neither parties’ added
value would have been achieved but the MOU negotiation process.
D. Federal Land Case Study: Nine Mile Canyon Case Study
The second case study is derived from a Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Foundation article authored by University of Utah law professor
Robert Keiter and his student Kirstin Lindstrom entitled, “Lessons from
Nine Mile Canyon: Achieving Consensus over Energy Development on
Public Lands.”78 In this article, Keiter and Lindstrom provide insight on a
controversial oil and gas development project that took place on Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) land in Utah’s energy-rich Uinta Basin.79
In 2004, the Bill Barrett Corporation (BBC) sought permission
from the BLM to drill 807 new oil and gas wells on 53,250 acres of federal
public land anticipating a recovery of one trillion cubic feet of natural gas

76.
Id. at 85.
77.
Id.
78.
Robert B. Keiter & Kirstin Lindstrom, Lessons from Nine Mile
Canyon: Achieving Consensus Over Energy Development on Public Lands, 57 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST., 3-1 (2011).
79.
Id.
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over the life of the project.80 The majority of the drill sites were proposed
to be located on the West Tavaputs Plateau with principal access to the
drill sites via an improved road through Nine Mile Canyon.81 Activists
opposed the project as it threatened Wilderness Study Areas on the West
Tavaputs Plateau, significant Native American rock art sites, and other
cultural resources in the Nine Mile Canyon.82
Given the array and significance of economic, cultural, and
environmental resources found in the Nine Mile Canyon-West Tavaputs
Plateau region, numerous stakeholders were interested in the BLM’s final
decision.83 The groups that had formally submitted comments on the
proposed action included the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
(SUWA), the National Trust for Historic Preservation (NTHP), several
Native American tribes, other environmental and cultural groups, the State
of Utah, and local government officials.84
Because the proposed project was located on federal public land,
NEPA was triggered, requiring the BLM to prepare an EIS to assess the
impacts associated with the project.85 As part of the EIS process, the BLM
is required to provide the public with an opportunity to comment on the
proposed development.86 Because of the concern over cultural and
wilderness resources, the BLM and BBC encountered “substantial
80.
Id. at 3-9.
81.
Id. (Prior to development, the Nine Mile Canyon road consisted of
an unpaved dirt track. Id. at 3-8.).
82.
Id. at 3-7 to 3-8 (Nine Mile Canyon is renowned for its Native
American cultural resources including rock art, granaries, and other ancient objects.
West Tavaputs Plateau contains several wilderness study areas (WSA) that are legally
protected under FLPMA. Id. Activists were concerned that the proposed project—
and the road traffic and dust it would generate—could irreparably harm the rock art
sites in the Canyon. Id. Further, they were concerned that the development of new
roads and drill sites on the Tavaputs Plateau would compromise the wilderness
characteristics in the WSAs located there. Id. The initial proposal contemplated
twenty well pads in designated WSAs and 218 well pads on lands with wilderness
character. Id.).
83.
Id. at 3-6.
84.
Id. at 3-10.
85.
Id. at 3-6.
86.
40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2017) (federal agencies are required to request
comments from the public after preparing a draft environmental impact statement).
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opposition” to the drilling proposal.87 The project also triggered the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).88 The NHPA implementing
regulations require federal agencies to determine whether proposed
projects cause any “adverse effects” and if so, initiate formal consultation
with interested parties.89
Out of concern for damage to cultural resources in Nine Mile
Canyon, NTHP, SUWA and others concerned about the proposed project
petitioned the BLM to be granted formal consultation party status under
NHPA § 106.90 After initially denying the request, the BLM eventually
agreed to initiate a formal consultation process, invited a number of parties
and employed a formal mediator to facilitate the meetings.91 Keiter and
Lindstrom describe the formal NHPA § 106 consultation process as a
transparent collaboration process that allows the parties to meet face-toface with government officials to share their knowledge and concerns.92
The process included opportunities for site visits to examine the damaged
rock art, making the problem less abstract and distant.93 According to
Keiter and Lindstrom, “the process helped the parties become better
acquainted with one another and each other’s concerns, encouraged them
to ignore their ideological differences, and enabled them to begin building
some mutual trust.”94 After a year-long process, the parties reached a
programmatic agreement to protect the cultural resources in Nine Mile
Canyon while allowing the natural gas project to proceed.95 The
agreement requires the parties to meet annually, includes provisions to
address actions to be taken in the event of adverse impact to the rock art
and a dispute resolution section.96
87.
Keiter, supra note 78, at 3-6.
88.
Id. at 3-6.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 3-11.
91.
Id. at 3-12.
92.
Id. at 3-13.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id. (Under the agreement, Bill Barrett Corporation's financial
contributions were significant and included: funds for a Cultural Resource Monitoring
Plan, new visitor interpretation sites, curation costs, cultural resource training for its
personnel, and a consultant to research the potential impacts of dust on rock art.)
96.
Id. at 3-14.
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Despite an agreement addressing the concerns with Nine Mile
Canyon, BBC still faced significant opposition to its proposal to drill West
Tavaputs Plateau.97 Having achieved success with the NHPA § 106
negotiations, BBC agreed to initiate private bilateral negotiations with
SUWA, the main environmental group opposing development on the
plateau.98 After a six-month bilateral negotiation, BBC and SUWA
reached a two-party agreement.99 In order to protect wilderness qualities,
BBC agreed to significantly scale back its development proposal and to
utilize new directional drilling technologies that would enable it to drill
from consolidated well pads.100
Because the BLM retained final decision authority over the
project, BBC and SUWA presented their agreement to the BLM.101
Further, because a draft EIS had already been issued, it was too late to
include the terms of the agreement in the draft.102 However, the BLM
found that the original range of alternatives considered in the draft EIS
were broad enough to accommodate inclusion of the terms of the
agreement into the final EIS.103 The BLM incorporated most of the terms
of the agreement into its final EIS and Record of Decision.104
Simultaneously, the BBC and SUWA met with other stakeholders and
urged them to support the agreement, which they ultimately did.105
Keiter and Lindstrom offer the following lessons learned from
BBC and SUWA Nine Mile Canyon and West Tavaputs Plateau
negotiations:

97.
Id. at 3-17 – 3-18.
98.
Id. at 3-18.
99.
Id.
100.
Id. at 3-20. (The reductions agreed to by the BBC included a 66%
reduction in the total operations area and an 88% reduction in new well pads. Id.)
101.
Id. at 3-19. (The authors noted that the fact that the BLM was not
part of the BBC-SUWA negotiation process actually facilitated the agreement because
the parties were able to establish a “mutually trusting relationship and to address the
issues candidly between themselves.” Id.)
102.
Id. at 3-20.
103.
Id. at 20.
104.
Id. at 3-20.
105.
Id. at 3-19.
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The NHPA § 106 requirements provided the framework
for convening a multi-party collaboration process that
resulted in a mutually agreeable agreement that both
protected natural resources and allowed the natural gas
development to proceed.106 The structured NHPA § 106
process enabled parties to get to know one another, and
thus, facilitated understanding and enabled the parties to
overcome longstanding strained ideological differences
and strained relationships.107
The project proponent’s willingness to undertake and pay
for the recommended mitigation measures helped the
parties arrive at a solution.108
A NEPA EIS process that only accepts public comment
through a one-way comment process, and does not
include face-to-face negotiations in a structured setting,
would not have assisted the parties in reaching this
agreement.109 The private bilateral negotiation model
should be an available dispute resolution option pursued
within the NEPA framework.110
While it is easier to engage in a bilateral negotiation
without the BLM present, the agency must be included at
some point given its “legal responsibility for the broader
public interest.”111
To accommodate negotiated agreements between
stakeholders, federal land managers should ensure NEPA
documents include a broad range of alternatives. This is
important for two reasons: (1) it ensures the agency has
flexibility to incorporate agreements into its decision
without having to issue a new draft EIS; and (2) it
provides the structure from which parties can negotiate to

Id. at 3-15.
Id. at 3-16.
Id.
Id. at 3-15.
Id. at 3-22.
Id. at 3-21.
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resolve their disputes without overstepping their limited
role in the formal decision-making process.112
The negotiating parties must be prepared to convince
other nonparticipating parties to support the agreement as
well as garner support from the federal agency decisionmaker.113
The BBC-SUWA agreement was a compromise, neither
achieved its goal, but the parties were able to protect their
interests and walked away with a more trusting
relationship while creating more value than if they had not
worked together.114

This case study exemplifies that both a formal NHPA § 106
collaborative process and private bilateral agreements can assist an oil and
gas developer to achieve a social license to operate on federal public lands
and can add value to all parties. In this instance, the added value to the
BBC was reduction in opposition to the project that likely would have
resulted in costly delays and litigation. The added value to the groups
opposing the project included a reduction in the overall scope of the
project and protection of critical resources. Neither parties added value
would be achieved if the collaborative process and the bilateral agreement
leading to the social license to operate had not been attempted.
III. THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL LICENSE IS ESSENTIALLY A
COLLABORATIVE PROCESS
There is no uniform approach to obtaining a social license because
circumstances vary among development projects, geography, community
characteristics and industry dependence, and stakeholder values and

112.
Id. at 3-22 to 3-23. The authors explain that federal land managers
should regard the drafting of NEPA alternatives as a potential tool for fostering
dialogue, setting the parameters for inner-party negotiations, and promoting
expeditious decision making by reducing the likelihood of post-negotiation NEPA
delays.” Id. at 3-23.
113.
Id. at 3-23.
114.
Id.
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concerns.115 However, social license “ingredients” and guidelines have
been identified and developed by researchers and trade associations that
define elements and processes that have several common
characteristics.116 Notably, Denver University Law Professor Don Smith
and Western State Colorado University co-author Jessica Richards have
summarized the trade association guidelines, extracting the common
factors or “ingredients” needed to obtain a social license.117
Among the social license ingredients identified by Smith and
Richards, are elements critical to the support of meaningful dialogue
around serious, potentially divisive issues. These elements include: trust,
open communication, transparency, and accountability.118 Building trust
is arguably the essential social license ingredient.119 Trust has been
defined as “a common belief among a group of individuals that another
group (1) will make good faith-efforts to behave in accordance with any
commitments both explicit and implicit,” (2) will “be honest in whatever
negotiations preceded such commitments,” and (3) will “not take
excessive advantage of another even when the opportunity is available.”120
Trust is achieved through open communication and community
engagement. Community engagement is a two-way process of both giving
and receiving information, which can take place through a number of
channels from one-on-one communications with individual community

115.
Smith, Richards, & Colwell, supra note 24, at 14-8.
116.
See IPIECA, Oil and Gas Industry Guidance on Voluntary
Sustainability Reporting – 2010 Update, Jan. 2011, IPIECA.org, http://www.ipieca.o
rg/publication/oil-and-gas-industry-guidancevoluntary-sustainability-reporting-2010update (last visited January 17, 2018); Jason Prno and D. Scott Slocombe, Exploring
the Origins of “Social License to Operate” in the Mining Sector: Perspectives from
Governance and Sustainability Theories, 37(3) RES. POL’Y, 346, 348-349 (2012).
117.
Smith & Richards, supra note 46 at 111-133.
118.
Id. at 112-121.
119.
Id. at 112.
120.
Ann Thomson and James Perry, Collaboration Processes: Inside
the Black Box, PUB. ADMIN. REV., 20, 22 (Dec. 2016) (citing L.L. Cummings and
Philip Bromiley, THE ORGANIZATIONAL TRUST INVENTORY 303 (Roderick
M. Kramer and Tom R. Ryler (1996)).
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stakeholders to public meetings and forums.121 Transparency on the part
of an industry seeking social license requires full disclosure of steps being
taken to minimize risks, acknowledgment of challenges and failures, and
disclosure of clearly defined steps to continually improve operations.122 A
company is accountable if it provides a clear signal to affected
communities that attainment and maintenance of a social license is a top
priority, such as ensuring adherence to social license principles through its
compensation of executives, managers, employees, and subcontractors.123
Other researchers link social license to trust and legitimacy. As
Gehman et. al. cite in their paper on legitimacy in social license, two of
the pioneering researchers on this topic, Susan Joyce and Ian Thompson,
included in their definition of social license to operate three normative
components: legitimacy, credibility and trust.124 Joyce and Thompson
define legitimacy as conforming to established legal, social, and cultural
norms, both formal and informal.125 They define credibility as “the quality
of being believed—the capacity or power to elicit belief” and trust is the
“willingness to be vulnerable to risk or loss through the actions of
another.”126
Joyce and Thompson differentiate between project
acceptance and approval, arguing that legitimacy is necessary for
acceptance, but credibility and trust are necessary for approval.127
121.
Am. Petroleum Inst., Community Engagement Guidelines, ANSI/
API 1003 First Edition, (July 2014), http://www.api.org/~/media/files/policy/explora
tion/100-3_e1.pdf. (last viewed January 17, 2018).
122.
Smith & Richards “Social License to Operate," supra note 46, at
118 (citing Extracting the Facts: An Investor Guide to Disclosing Risks from
Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility and
Investor Environmental Health Network 3, http://iehn.org/documents/frackguidance.
pdf (2011)).
123.
Id. at 120–121.
124.
JOEL GEHMAN, LIANNE M. LEFSRUD, AND STEWART FAST, SOCIAL
LICENSE TO OPERATE: LEGITIMACY BY ANOTHER NAME?, 60(2) Canadian Public
Administration, 293, 295 (2017).
125.
Ian Thomson and Susan Joyce, The Social License to Operate:
What is it And Why Does it Seem So Difficult to Obtain? Presentation to the
Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada Convention (Mar. 2008),
available at http://www.oncommonground.ca/wp/downloads/PDAC_2008_Social_L
icence.pdf.
126.
Id.
127.
Id.
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Smith and Richards also identify a number of procedural elements
that contribute to social license, including methods for identifying
stakeholders, broadening decision-making procedures, and establishing
agreements and grievance procedures.128 A stakeholder can be broadly
defined as “[a]ny person, group or entity that has interest or concern in an
organization and its activities.”129 However, the typical context of social
license is project-based, hence a more operable definition of a stakeholder
is a person, group or entity that will be affected by a project or has a strong
interest in it.130 With respect to how stakeholders interact with companies,
we can further refine the definition of stakeholders as “individuals acting
both in their roles as citizens and as formal representatives of collective[ly]
interested and affected parties.”131
In a conventional approach to oil and gas project planning and
development, the company is a unitary decision-maker that proposes a
development plan publically and then defends it against opposition.132
This approach has done little to help companies achieve a social license.
Instead, Smith and Richards suggest broadening decision-making
procedures and establishing agreements with communities by involving
the community early in the project’s design phase.133 Involving the
community early on provides a voice to community concerns and
community ownership, which in turn contributes toward the achievement
of a social license by the company.134 There are many ways to broaden
decision-making procedures, but at a minimum, views of stakeholders
must reach corporate decision-makers in a well-defined way and must be
128.
Smith & Richards, supra note 46, at 121–125.
129.
Am. Petroleum Inst., supra note 121, at vi.
130.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Science Advisory Board,
Improved Science-Based Environmental Stakeholder Processes, EPA-SAB-ECCOM-01-006), Yosemite.epa.gov, https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/42E
4E3AF4DC15AB4852578650059DE8F/$File/eecm01006_report_appna-e.pdf (this
definition is extrapolated from a discussion of stakeholder definition on pp. 6-7).
131.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 15 (Thomas Dietz and Paul C. Stern eds., 2008).
132.
Smith & Richards, supra note 46, at 123.
133.
Id. 123–124.
134.
Id. 123–124 (citing Jim Kent & Kevin Preister, Surging Industries
in Global Energy: Creating a New Era in Community Engagement, RIGHT OF WAY
(July/Aug. 2013)).
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taken into consideration.135 Community involvement in company
decisions may also extend to a company’s grievance procedures. The
establishment of community-based grievance mechanism or grievance
procedure is a process, wholly or partially run by a company, that resolves
community concerns or grievances.136
At its core, social license to operate involves a significant degree
of meaningful dialogue between the firm and the community in the
planning and operation of the industrial activity. Dialogue in this context
is face-to-face interaction with multiple stakeholders that encourages longterm relationships between industry and affected communities, and where
the firm and affected stakeholders resolve their opposing interests in order
to achieve their respective goals. This interaction with stakeholders is the
essence of collaboration. An often-cited definition of collaboration is, “a
process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can
constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go
beyond their own limited vision of what is possible.”137 Constructive
exploration of differences between the firm and stakeholders creates the
environment for the firm to establish the legitimacy, credibility, and trust
necessary to obtain a social license to operate.
There is a rich and extensive literature on collaboration which is
variously defined and described as, among other labels, collaborative
problem solving, collaborative decision-making, collaborative
governance, environmental conflict resolution, alternative dispute
resolution, consensus building, and co-management. Collaboration as we
define it here “involves informal but structured face-to-face interaction
among representatives of stakeholder groups who hold different
viewpoints. The goals are to promote early participation by the affected
stakeholders; produce sensible and stable policies or decisions that have a
strong, broad base of support; and reduce the likelihood of subsequent
disagreements or legal challenges.”138

135.
136.
137.

Id. at 123.
Id. at 122–123.
BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING COMMON GROUND
FOR MULTIPARTY PROBLEMS 5 (1998).
138.
PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 10 (Rosemary O'Leary, and Lisa Bingham eds., 2003).
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Collaborative processes are differentiated from other forms of
public involvement in the interaction’s intensity, convening officials’
goals, and stakeholders’ implicit authority. The International Association
of Public Participation (IAP2) places collaboration among a spectrum of
public participation methods.139 The public participation spectrum goes
from least to most intense, moving from merely informing, to consulting,
to involving, to collaborating, and finally, to empowering.140 For example,
the public participation goal of consulting is to “obtain public feedback on
analysis, alternatives, and/or decisions.”141 In this mode, officials preserve
their authority and power but commit themselves to receiving input from
participants. The stated purpose of most public hearings and many other
public meetings is to provide such advice.142
In contrast to less intensive forms of public involvement, the goal
of collaboration according to IAP2, is to “partner with the public in each
aspect of the decision including the development of alternatives and the
identification of the preferred solution.”143 Collaborative processes are
typically used to foster dialogue, clarify areas of agreement and
disagreement, improve the information on which a decision is based, and
resolve controversial issues in ways that all interests find acceptable.144
They typically involve stakeholders in a mode of aggregating their
preferences and bargaining to achieve their interests. In this mode,
stakeholders know what they want, and the mode of decision-making
aggregates their preferences — often mediated by the influence and power
that they bring — into a social choice.145 The exploration of interests and
give-and-take of bargaining allows participants to find the best available
options to advance their joint preferences.146
139.
Int’l Ass’n of Pub. Participation, IAP2 Spectrum of Public
Participation, C.cymcdn.com, https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iap2.org/resource/
resmgr/files/iap-006_brochure_a3_internat.pdf.
140.
Id.
141.
Id.
142.
Archon Fung, Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance,
66(s1) PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 69 (2006).
143.
Id.
144.
PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION, supra note 138, at 10.
145.
Fung, supra note 142, at 68.
146.
Id.

2018

COLLABORATION THROUGH NEPA

229

Collaborative processes are founded on principled engagement, a
term that is drawn from the work of Fisher and Ury in their classic book,
Getting to Yes.147 Principled engagement “means the use of processes that
uphold core tenets of effective engagement. Included among these tenets
are fair and civil discourse and open and inclusive communication that are
informed by the perspectives and knowledge of all participants.
Moreover, effective engagement typically requires balanced
representation from all relevant and significant interests.”148
Collaboration consists of processes and techniques that enable
parties to jointly identify the issues to be resolved and reach agreement on
a solution.149 Practitioners and researchers generally agree on a set of
principles or characteristics that collaborative processes share.150 These
are namely:
1. Participation is voluntary,151 and participants and
sponsors are committed to participate in good faith with
an open mindset to new perspectives.152
2. Parties must be able to participate directly, be willing to
use this strategy, and be able to select their own
representatives.153
3. All participants are fully informed of the purpose and
objectives of the process, are engaged in defining and
enforcing process protocols and ground rules, and seek
agreement on how to share, test, and apply relevant
information.154

147.
ROGER FISHER AND WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2011).
148.
KIRK EMERSON AND TINA NABATCHI, COLLABORATIVE
GOVERNANCE REGIMES 59 (2015).
149.
Getting to Yes, supra note 147, at 15.
150.
PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION, supra note 139, at 6.
151.
Id.
152.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND
DECISION MAKING, supra note 131, at 24.
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
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4. Communication is open and accurate. Parties must be able
to engage in full, open, and truthful exchange.155
5. Parties must realize that they are interdependent. At the
same time, any and all participants must have the option
to withdraw and seek a resolution through other means.156
6. Parties must agree to the outcome of the process157 and
commit to the implementation of agreements.158
A typical collaborative process has three, well-defined stages,
each containing a number of steps, tasks, or objectives.159 In the predeliberation stage a sponsor or convener raises the possibility of
collaboration and initiates the process. Before convening the parties, there
is usually an attempt to assess the issues and identify potentially affected
parties. Such an assessment helps the sponsor or convener develop a
strategy for bringing the parties together and managing the collaborative
process.
During the deliberation stage, parties gather and share information
about the issues to be deliberated, and agree on methods for generating
answers to relevant technical questions, or a path to follow, even if no
technical consensus exists. They identify and share interests—reasons,
needs, concerns, and motivations underlying participants' positions—
rather than assert positions. Through the sharing of information and
concerns, they converge on and define the problems to be resolved through
their deliberations. Once the parties have clearly articulated the issues that
need to be resolved and identified all parties’ interests at the table, the next
step is to find solutions that resolve the issues and satisfy the interests. In
155.
HOWARD RAIFFA, NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART
OF COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING, 83 (2002).
156.
PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION, supra note 139, at 6.
157.
Id.
158.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND
DECISION MAKING, supra note 131, at 24.
159.
LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE
IMPASSE, CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987)
(outlining three major stages of the negotiation process including: pre-negotiation,
negotiation, and post-negotiation. Id. Here, the term "negotiation" has been softened
somewhat and reframed as "deliberation" in order to generalize to a range of
collaborative decision-making processes.).
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this stage, they work to brainstorm options that have the potential satisfy
the interests of all parties. Using objective criteria to evaluate the options,
parties converge on a set options or pathways that resolve the issues that
divide them and reach an agreement on how to move forward.
The post-deliberation phase ensures implementation of the
agreement. Areas of agreement are documented to ensure a common
understanding of the participants' accord. At this stage the parties also
ratify the agreement with their constituents. Parties garner support for the
agreement from interest groups they represent as well as organizations that
have a role in carrying it out. Each party follows its own internal
procedures as it reviews and adopts the agreement or plan.
Firms that wish to operate in communities and landscapes where
their actions are viewed negatively and their motives as illegitimate and
untrustworthy may be best served by collaborating with community
members and other affected parties. By initiating and sustaining a
collaborative process that adheres to foundational principles and best
practices, companies have the opportunity to produce operational
decisions that have a strong, broad base of support, and can reduce the
likelihood of subsequent disagreements or legal challenges. In other
words, they can achieve a social license to operate.
IV. NEPA: A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO INCLUDE
COLLABORATION TO ACHIEVE A SOCIAL LICENSE ON PUBLIC
LAND OIL AND GAS PROJECTS
Despite the opportunity to add value, social license to operate has
seldom been utilized in federal public land oil and gas development
projects. We speculate that this is because oil and gas operators perceive
the legal license to operate on federal public lands, particularly compliance
with NEPA, to equate to a social license to operate. In fact, this is more
than a speculation. This point arose during our 2015 Energy &
Collaboration Summit with energy executives in Jackson, Wyoming.160
During that conversation, executives from oil and gas companies indicated
that many federal land energy operators perceive compliance with the
160.
Energy & Collaboration Summit, Jackson, Wyoming (Mar. 6,
2014) (unpublished conference report) (on file with the author).
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NEPA process as inhibiting collaboration and preventing companies from
going beyond compliance in order to work directly with affected
communities and stakeholders to achieve a social license to operate.161
Citing the increased opposition to federal public land oil and gas projects,
the participants indicated that engaging in a well-defined and structured
collaborative process to achieve a social license offered greater value to
the company than just complying with the required legal license processes
(particularly NEPA).162
Contrary to the Summit participants’ perception, we argue that
NEPA is not a barrier to greater incorporation of collaborative processes
to achieve a social license. After a review of NEPA itself, the Council of
Environmental Quality (CEQ) NEPA regulations, agency specific NEPA
regulations and guidance, case law, and other potential federal agency
procedural discretionary limits, we conclude that the NEPA process
actually provides a unique opportunity to incorporate collaboration into
federal public land oil and gas development projects in order to achieve a
social license to operate. That unique opportunity exists because unlike
development on private land, the legal license requirements of compliance
with NEPA provides oil and gas companies with a defined structure from
which to engage communities and stakeholders through a collaborative
process in order to achieve a social license to operate.
A. The NEPA Process Explained163
At the heart of NEPA is a mandate to all federal agencies to
prepare a “detailed statement” for every “major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”164 This
“detailed statement” must include: the environmental impact of the
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Portions of this section were originally published by the Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation in the manual of the Special Institute on the
National Environmental Policy Act of 2017. See Temple Stoellinger, “Having Your
Voice Heard: How to Effectively Get the Agency’s Attention in a NEPA Comment to
Affect the Final Decision,” National Environmental Policy Act 9-1, ROCKY MT. MIN.
L. FDN. (2017).
164.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2018).
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proposed action, adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided,
alternatives to the proposed action, the relationship between short-term
uses of the environment and long-term productivity, and any irreversible
and irretrievable commitments of resources.165 Prior to preparing a
“detailed statement,” the federal agency must consult with and obtain
comments from “any Federal agency that has jurisdiction by law or special
expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.”166
To find more specificity on the NEPA process, we must turn to
the CEQ NEPA regulations. CEQ, established through NEPA, 167 was
directed in 1977 by President Jimmy Carter to promulgate NEPA
implementing regulations, binding on all agencies.168 Those regulations,
found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508, were promulgated to inform federal
agencies of what they must do to comply with the NEPA procedures.169
The regulations require federal agencies to “identify and assess the
reasonable alternatives to a proposed action that will avoid or minimize
adverse effects of these action upon the quality of the human
environment.”170 Specifically, the CEQ regulations provide specific
directions on when and how to prepare the NEPA required “detailed
statement,” renamed in the CEQ regulations as an environmental impact
165.
Id. § 4332(c)(i)-(v).
166.
Id. § 4332(c).
167.
Id. § 4342.
168.
Relating to Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality,
Exec. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26967 (May 24, 1977) (The Executive
order directed the CEQ to issue regulations to Federal agencies that implemented the
procedural provisions of NEPA. Id. Penn State University Law Professor Jamison
Colburn has pointed to the fact that NEPA says nothing about CEQ enacting rules,
instead the rules were enacted at the direction of President Jimmy Carter. Jamison E.
Colburn, Administering the National Environmental Policy Act, 45 ENVTL. L. REP.
10287 (Apr. 2015) (referencing Exec Order No 11991). Meaning, it is not NEPA
itself, but rather the president’s “constitutional powers that ground the very NEPA
rules forming the basis of contemporary NEPA law.” Id. Professor Colburn notes that
NEPA’s real goals “are no less than the remaking of American into a sustainable
civilization” but it was the CEQ regulations that transformed NEPA into a procedural
statute and set those procedures into law. Id. He suggests that had a pre-enforcement
review petition on assertion of authority been viable, the conclusion might have been
that CEQ had no power of its own to administer NEPA. Id. at 10296.).
169.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (2017).
170.
Id. § 1500.2.
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statement (EIS).171 Most oil and gas projects on federal public lands are
“major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment,”172 and therefore, the federal agency tasked with approving
the project must prepare an EIS.173 EISs are prepared in the following
stages: scoping, draft, final, and the agency’s decision documented in a
Record of Decision (ROD).
The first stage of an EIS is known as “scoping.”174 Scope is
defined as “the range of actions, alternatives, and impacts to be considered
in an environmental impact statement.”175 During scoping, federal
agencies are required to identify and invite participation of “[a]ffected
Federal, State, and local agencies, any affected Indian tribe, the proponent
of the action, and other interested persons.”176 The agency may hold
public meetings during the scoping process, but is not required to do so.177
The scoping process is initiated when the agency files a notice of intent in
the Federal Register.178 The notice of intent must include: a description of
the proposed action and possible alternatives, describe the agency’s
proposed scoping process including whether, when, and where any
scoping meetings will be held, and include contact information for a
person in the agency who can answer questions about the proposed action
and EIS.179
The next step in the NEPA process is the completion of a draft
EIS.180 According to CEQ regulations, draft EISs “shall be prepared in
accordance with the scope decided upon in the scoping process” and
should include all of the analysis and information required to be contained
in a final EIS.181 Draft EISs “shall provide full and fair discussion of
171.
Id. §§ 1502.1–1502.25.
172.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2018).
173.
40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.11, 1501.4(e).
174.
Id. § 1508.25.
175.
Id. (The definition of scope also includes a list of actions,
alternatives and impacts an agency can consider to determine the scope. Id.)
176.
Id. § 1501.7(a)(1) (emphasis added) (While interested persons is
not defined, we can assume it means interested members of the public. Id.).
177.
Id. § 1501.7(b)(4).
178.
Id. § 1501.7.
179.
Id. § 1508.22 (definition of a notice of intent).
180.
Id. § 1502.9.
181.
40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a) (2017).
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significant environmental impacts and shall inform the public of the
reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts
or enhance the quality of the human environment.”182 Once a draft EIS is
completed, a federal agency must request the comments of state and local
agencies, Indian tribes, other federal agencies, the project applicant (if
any), and the public.183 Specifically, the agency must “affirmatively solicit
comments from those persons or organizations who may be interested or
affected.”184 To accomplish the requirement, agencies must publish a
Notice of Availability (NOA) in the Federal Register, informing the public
that the draft is available and public comment on the draft is being
accepted.185 The public is then provided a minimum of 45 days to submit
comments on the draft EIS.186
Agencies must respond to comments received on the draft EIS and
to “any responsible opposing view which was not adequately discussed in
the draft statement and shall indicate the agency’s response to the issues
raised.”187 Once the final EIS is completed, the agency must circulate the
final in the same manner as it did the draft EIS. 188 Although agencies do
not have to request comments on a final EIS, they may choose to do so.189
It is important to note that the final EIS is not the final agency decision.190
Instead, the final agency decision is rendered in a “record of decision” or
ROD, which is prepared and signed after the agency issues the final EIS.191
In a ROD, agencies must state their decision regarding the proposed
182.
Id. § 1502.1 (offering the purpose of an environmental impact
statements. The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement, as prescribed
in the regulation, is to “serve as an action forcing decision to ensure that the policies
and goals defined in the Act [NEPA] are infused into the ongoing programs and
actions of the Federal Government.” Id.).
183.
Id. § 1503.1(a).
184.
Id. § 1503.1(a)(4).
185.
Id. § 1506.10(a).
186.
Id. § 1506.10(c) (allowing for extending and reducing the comment
period. Id.).
187.
Id. § 1502.9(b).
188.
Id. § 1502.19.
189.
Id. § 1503.1(b).
190.
Id. § 1505.2.
191.
Id. (requiring that at the time of its decision, agencies are required
to “prepare a concise public record of the decision.” Id.).
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action, identify all alternatives considered in reaching the decision, and
state whether all practical means to avoid or minimize environmental harm
were adopted.192 When discussing the alternatives considered, the agency
must discuss the factors relevant to its decision, including economic and
technical considerations and the agency’s statutory mission.193
B. A Procedural Floor, Not a Procedural Ceiling
Procedural statutes like NEPA establish the procedural floor
rather than the procedural ceiling and “typically leave agencies free to
experiment with procedures that elaborate upon the statutory
minimum.”194 As long as an agency is not violating a provision of NEPA,
how they implement the statute is up to the agency’s discretion.
While the CEQ regulations do include specific requirements to
seek public comment during specific touch points in the NEPA process,
nothing in NEPA itself or the CEQ regulations preclude a federal agency
from including more public involvement through collaboration during the
NEPA process. Rather than providing a barrier, the requirement in CEQ
regulation § 506.6 to “make diligent efforts to involve the public in
preparing and implementing their NEPA procedures”195 and to “solicit
appropriate information from the public,”196 arguably offers authority for
federal agencies to incorporate more public involvement, including
collaborative processes to achieve a social license.
In addition to considering the procedural floor established in
NEPA and the CEQ regulations, we must also consider any procedural
limitations the agencies implementing NEPA may have included for
themselves. Two federal agencies that would be in a position to prepare
an oil and gas NEPA document are the BLM and the United States Forest
Service (Forest Service). Far from setting any procedural limits, the BLM
and Forest Service specifically revised their NEPA regulations in 2008 to
expressly include the opportunity to incorporate more collaboration into
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194.
Emily S. Bremer and Sharon B. Jacobs, Agency Innovation in
Vermont Yankee’s White Space, 32 J. OF LAND USE & ENVT’L LAW, 523, 535 (2017).
195.
40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(a) (2017) (emphasis added).
196.
Id. § 1506.6(d).
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their NEPA processes.197 The BLM did so by including the following
statement in its regulation on EIS content: “responsible official may
collaborate with those persons or organizations that may be interested or
affected to modify a proposed action and alternatives(s) under
consideration prior to issuing a draft environmental impact statement.”
Similarly, but more subtlety, the Forest Service did so by including its
revised regulation on EIS content that a “responsible official may modify
the proposed action and alternative(s) under consideration prior to issuing
a draft EIS.”198
C. Incorporating Collaboration Into the NEPA Process
In October 2007, the President’s Council on Environmental
Quality issued a handbook for NEPA practitioners on collaboration in
NEPA.199 The CEQ handbook identifies many opportunities for
collaboration with interested stakeholders throughout a NEPA process.
The handbook provides advice for how to collaborate across the different
phases of the NEPA process including identification of the proposed
action and its purpose and need, scoping, development of alternatives and
a preferred alternative, identification of the affected environment and
environmental consequences, and implementation and monitoring of the
ROD.200 The only NEPA-related activities not open to collaboration are
197.
See Forest Service National Environmental Policy Act Procedures
Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,084 (July 24, 2008) (The Forest Service NEPA regulations
were revised in 20087 to “provide an environmental analysis process that better fits
with modern thinking on decision making, collaboration, and adaptive management
by describing a process for incremental alternative development and development of
adaptive management alternatives.”); Department of the Interior Implementation of
the NEPA Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 73 Fed. Reg. 126 (Jan. 2, 2008)
(The DOI NEPA regulations were revised in part in 2008 to “allow for better
integration of NEPA procedures and documentation into current Departmental
decision-making processes, including collaboration and incremental decisionmaking.” Id.).
198.
36 C.F.R. § 220.5(e)(1) (2018).
199.
Collaboration in NEPA: A Handbook for NEPA Practitioners,
Council on Environmental Quality (2007) http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/
CEQ_Collaboration_in_NEPA_10-2007.pdf.
200.
Id.
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the final decision-making and issuance of the ROD or Finding of No
Significant Impact for which a federal agency alone is responsible.201
Federal agencies, including the Forest Service and BLM, have
been exploring ways to make NEPA processes more equitable, effective,
and efficient by incorporating collaborative approaches.202 As noted
above, both the BLM and the Forest Service revised their NEPA
regulations in 2008 to clarify that NEPA alternatives may be modified
through an incremental process.203 The revised language in both agencies’
NEPA regulations was intended to support efforts to include incremental
changes to alternatives that are generated through collaboration.204
Incorporating incremental changes into an EIS as the agency collaborates
with various stakeholders during the NEPA process is known as iterative
NEPA (iNEPA). iNEPA since it allows federal agencies to iteratively
develop alternatives that meet as many stakeholder interests as possible.205
We argue that the BLM and/or Forest Service can utilize an
iNEPA approach to incorporate stakeholder and community collaboration
into the NEPA process in order to achieve a social license to operate for
oil and gas developments on federal public land.
D. Application of iNEPA
The traditional approach to EIS development has generally been
to inform and take feedback from the public during the scoping and draft
document stages. In its environmental analysis, the agency outlines a
series of potential alternative actions, including the “no action” alternative,
analyzes each action in detail, and selects one alternative as the basis for
its decision.206 Here, public engagement consists of a presentation of the
purpose and need, already formulated by the agency, and a following draft
201.
Id. at 4.
202.
Jessica M. Clement, Iterative NEPA and Collaboration,
Proceedings of
the
iNEPA Workshop, 5 (Feb. 10-11, 2014), (http://www.
uwyo.edu/haub/_files/_docs/ruckelshaus/pubs/2015-inepa-report.pdf.
203.
Forest Service National Environmental Policy Act Procedures
Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,084 (July 24, 2008); Dept. of the Interior Implementation
of the NEPA Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 73 Fed. Reg. 126 (Jan. 2,
2008).
204.
Iterative NEPA and Collaboration, supra note 202, at 7.
205.
Id. at 6.
206.
40 C.F.R. § 1505.1(e) (2017).
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document, to which the public can only respond, not engage. Because of
this, the agency will often find itself dealing with serious distrust at best
and extended court challenges at worst.
Rather than an agency merely taking public input and trying to
balance interests in a series of alternatives, most of which will be discarded
anyway, it can be more efficient for the agency to work with the public on
a continuous basis to meet as many interests as possible. During this
process, alternatives are created by all interests that outline location of oil
and gas infrastructure, measures to mitigate or avoid impacts, monitoring
methods, and other pertinent aspects of the operation. By engaging in a
learning process where stakeholders identify the potential opportunities
and problems related to the proposed project, and finding solutions for
mutual gain that form the agency’s (and the public’s) preferred alternative,
the agency and the project proponent can begin the process of establishing
the legitimacy, credibility, and trust necessary for achieving a social
license.
There are two approaches that an agency can take to include the
public collaboratively in oil and gas decisions. The first is to engage
stakeholders in advance of publishing the Notice of Intent and initiating
the NEPA process. Such informal or “pre-NEPA” collaboration allows
the agency to explore the purpose and need for the proposed project with
stakeholders and generate alternatives that meet their interests. The
potential outcome of pre-NEPA collaboration is that stakeholders can help
to define the range of alternatives that are incorporated and analyzed in the
draft environmental statement, and even help to define the preferred
alternative prior to the development of the draft EIS.
The second approach is to formally build collaboration into the
NEPA process through iNEPA in which the agency works with all
interests in a systematic way, from conceptualizing the proposed action
through generating the final NEPA document. iNEPA encourages
agencies to adapt and modify proposals and alternatives by iteratively
developing them with the public.207 While agencies are not required to
incorporate collaboration into their iNEPA processes, iNEPA lends itself
to being combined with an integrated and collaborative approach. It
allows agencies to develop an EIS with stakeholders that includes a
207.

Id. at 6.
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preferred alternative that has been developed collaboratively.208 iNEPA is
particularly applicable when the federal action triggering NEPA is both
complex and contentious. In that instance, a collaborative approach that
creates efficiency and trust will provide the most benefit to the agency, a
project proponent, and stakeholders.
Efficiencies are created by iteratively working with the public to
create alternatives that contain the ideas, knowledge, and buy-in of as
many interests as possible.209 NEPA documents often are created to meet
legal requirements and generate management alternatives that staff can
handle.210 But if public engagement is reduced to the minimum required
under CEQ regulations and the process is perceived to be in opposition to
what many interests want, the document may wind up being challenged
anyway.211 The iNEPA approach allows agencies to be proactive and
systematically include public deliberation into the planning process.
Collaborating with the public and iteratively developing a preferred
alternative that meets stakeholders’ interests reduces the amount of time
that would be required to analyze a series of alternatives that would not be
used anyway.
Additionally, including the public in meaningful
deliberation and learning increases trust in the agency and ultimately
social license into both the agency’s actions and documentation.212
It is eminently feasible for an agency and a proponent to work with
the public to find solutions in a more efficient and inclusive manner under
NEPA. Given an agency decision maker and staff who understand the
opportunities iNEPA and other inclusive approaches provide, and the
expertise on board to convene and guide a public process to the creation
of alternatives that meet as many interests as possible, there is no reason
not to start a project using this approach. An energy company could
benefit from the creation of social license using iNEPA and can work with
an agency to implement this approach.
208.
Id.
209.
Id. at 11.
210.
Marc J. Stern et. al., From the Office to the Field: Areas of Tension
and Consensus in the Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act
Within the US Forest Service, 91 J. OF ENVT’L MGMT, 1350, 1351 (2010).
211.
Id.
212.
Jessica Western (Clement) & Michele Straube, iNEPA, the iPhone
of Environmental Impact Review, Makes NEPA more User-Friendly, 30 A.B.A. SEC.
OF THE ENV’T, ENERGY, AND RES., 41, (2015).
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E. Using iNEPA to Foster Collaboration to Achieve a Social License to
Operate
There are a few examples of how federal agencies have used
iNEPA to iteratively and collaboratively meet as many interests as
possible through a NEPA process. Examples include: the expansion of
snowmobiling in California, the building of a large parking garage in
Michigan, and the large-landscape scale restoration of aspen stands in
Utah.213 A more energy-specific example of iNEPA application that
resulted in the achievement of a social license took place on the
Uncompahgre Plateau in Colorado.214 During the development of the
Uncompahgre Plateau Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration
Project, the Forest Service and its constituents needed to find a way to fund
the restoration of mule deer habitat in fire-suppressed ponderosa pine
stands.215 Among the public, the Forest Service found a great deal of
support for biomass utilization as a way to fund restoration and support
the local economy.216 However, there were some interest groups that were
concerned that conducting treatments to allow a biomass utilization
operation to be financially viable would lead to more treatments than were
necessary to restore the forest.217 This polarization of opinions lead the
Forest Service to explore how they might develop a social license to
operate to use forest biomass for energy development.218
The Forest Service used an iterative and collaborative approach to
reduce scientific uncertainty and to quantitatively identify the level of
social acceptance for biomass harvesting and utilization.219 While the
collaborative approach took two years, once completed it enabled the
213.
Iterative NEPA and Collaboration, supra note 202, at 14–16.
214.
Jessica M. Western et. al., Examining the Social Acceptability of
Forest Biomass Harvesting and Utilization From Collaborative Forest Landscape
Restoration: A Case Study From Western Colorado, USA, J. OF FORESTRY (115 ed.)
6, 530 (2017).
215.
Id. at 532.
216.
Id. at 533.
217.
Id. at 535.
218.
Id. at 537.
219.
Id. at 538.

242

PUBLIC LANDS & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol.39

Forest Service to quickly and without objection, develop an
Environmental Assessment in six months.220 Using an iterative and
collaborative approach, the agency managed to fulfill the need to restore
the forest, improve wildlife habitat for mule deer, create a predictable
supply of biomass with which a company could start building its
operations, and create more jobs in the community.221 By using this
approach, the agency achieved a social license to operate and created far
more value than just restoring a forest.222
Despite the existence of the iNEPA option, federal personnel often
cling to their fear (or comfort)223 of adopting new approaches. Agency fear
of utilizing their discretionary authority was discussed by J.B. Ruhl and
Kyle Robisch in their recent article entitled “Agencies Running From
Agency Discretion".224 In the article, they note that while discretion has
been defined as the “root source of administrative agency power and
influence,” agencies have been reluctant to run with discretion and have
instead run from it.225 They suggest that agencies run from their
discretionary authority because of the “process baggage” or decision
making prerequisites that comes with exercising discretion in the modern
administrative state.226 The effect of process baggage not only has an
“ossification” effect on federal agency use of discretionary decision
making authority, it has also led agencies to claim a lack of discretionary
authority.227
So why are federal agencies running from their discretionary
authority to incorporate more collaboration into the NEPA process? In a
2013 master’s thesis, Colorado State Journalism and Technical
Communication student Peggy Cochran Roberts addressed that very

220.
Id. at 531.
221.
Id.
222.
In this instance it was the Forest Service desiring and achieving the
social license, but in an oil and gas context it will be the project proponent, not the
federal agency seeking the social license.
223.
Stern, supra note 210, at 1351.
224.
J.B. Ruhl & Kyle Robisch, Agencies Running from Agency
Discretion, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV., 97, 102 (2016).
225.
Id.
226.
Id.
227.
Id. at 102–103.
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point.228 In her thesis, Roberts assessed the acceptance or rejection federal
agency staff had toward implementing collaborative public participation
techniques and explored the factors that either encouraged or discouraged
their willingness to adopt collaboration techniques into NEPA decisionmaking processes.229 The factors she identified that contribute to agency
staff willingness to adopt collaborative public participation techniques
included: meeting regulatory requirements, agency culture, agency
commitment, and the ability to measure success.230 The factors identified
that discouraged implementation of collaborative techniques included:
lack of staff education about collaboration techniques, cost, schedule, staff
availability, and staff experience.231
In addition to the factors Roberts identified, there are other factors
to take into consideration. External to the agency, staff have experienced
how some parties do not participate in collaboration and instead “wait in
the wings” to file critical comments and/or litigate.232 In other situations,
because an agency did not use collaborative approaches, diverse interests
worked together to design a consensus-derived alternative, only to find it
rejected by the agency which increased frustration and lack of trust.233
Finally, extensive evidence exists that within the agency, decision makers
and line officers often disqualify the quality of input from the public and
object to collaborative approaches, thereby incurring opportunity costs
and missing chances to find mutually agreed common sense solutions.234
As the collaborative process that leads to a social license to
operate will be most beneficial to the oil and gas operator, what can
operators do to encourage agencies to utilize an iNEPA approach? First,
operators should become familiar with iNEPA and collaboration
themselves. Second, the operator should advocate for agencies to use the
iNEPA approach. Third, operators can assist the agencies in bolstering the
228.
Peggy Cochran Roberts, Factors Influencing Agency Staff’s
Willingness to Adopt Collaborative Public Participation Techniques in the NEPA
Decision-Making Process 1 (2013) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Colorado State
University), available at https://dspace.library.colostate.edu/bitstream/handle/10217/
81075/Roberts_colostate_ 0053N_12088.pdf.
229.
Id. at 3.
230.
Id. at 26.
231.
Id.
232.
Id. at 33–34.
233.
Western and Straube, supra note 212, at 41.
234.
Id. at 41; Stern, supra note 210, at 1355.
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capacity of stakeholders to participate in an iNEPA process by supporting
outreach, training, information, blogs, and face-to-face opportunities can
all be used to enhance this capacity. Finally, as the cost of collaborative
approaches is sometimes considered a hindering factor, the company can
agree to pay for the costs associated with the collaborative effort, including
if necessary, costs of a trained facilitator to run the process.
V. THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT, THE
ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM
Despite the flexibility contained in NEPA, the CEQ NEPA
regulations, and the agency’s NEPA regulations (particularly the new
iNEPA regulations) to incorporate public collaboration into NEPA
processes in order to achieve a social license, there is a substantial federal
legal limit to agency’s ability to do so: The Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA).235
FACA, passed in 1972 during the “good government” initiative of
the 1970’s, governs agency solicitation of policy advice from outside
groups236 and is intended to ensure that citizen involvement in federal
decisions is equitable and that individuals or groups do not have undue
influence.237 Whenever a federal agency intends to “establish, control, or
management a group that has at least one member who is not a federal,
tribal, state or local government employee” the agency must comply with
FACA.238 Compliance with FACA requires the federal agency to establish
235.
5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2012).
236.
Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory
Committee Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG., 451, 452-53 (1997)
(explaining that FACA was passed “in part out of concern that some interests had
come to enjoy unchecked and perhaps illicit access to federal executive
decisionmakers.”)
237.
U.S. Forest Serv., Key Principles and Practical Advice for
Complying with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, (Nov. 2, 2011), Fs.usda.gov,
https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5203270.pdf.
238.
U.S. BLM, Bureau of Land Management National Policy for the
Federal Advisory Committee Act: What BLM Staff Need to Know When Working with
ADR-Based Collaborative Community Working Groups, 1 (May 2005) Ntc.blm.gov,
https://www.ntc.blm.gov/krc/uploads/880/BLM%20Field%20Guide%20%20Federal%20Advisory%20Committee%20Act%20-%202005-05-01.pdf.
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a federal advisory committee (FAC), a lengthy and time consuming
process.239 A FAC is defined as:
any committee, board, commission, council, panel, task
force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or
other subgroup thereof …, which is
(A) established by statute or reorganization plan,
or
(B) established or utilized by the President, or
(C) established or utilized by one or more
agencies, in the interest of obtaining advice or
recommendations for the President or one or more
agencies or officers of the Federal Government . . .240
There are three apparent components to an advisory committee:
(1) FACA only applies to a group (not individuals), (2) groups subject to
the Act must be established by statute or utilized by the President or a
federal agency, and (3) established groups must be utilized for the purpose

239.
Melinda Harm Benson, Integrating Adaptive Management and Oil
and Gas Development: Existing Obstacles and Opportunities for Reform, 36 ENVT. L.
REP., 10962, 10970 (2009) (explaining that it took two years for a federal advisory
committee to be approved for the Pinedale Anticline Working Group, and by that time,
the group had lost both its momentum and its ability to keep pace with the oil and gas
development for which they were tasked with monitoring and making adaptive
management recommendations).
240.
5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2) (2012). In addition to complying with the
requirements in FACA itself, Executive Order 12,838 further instructs federal
agencies to reduce their reliance upon advisory committees by up to a third and to only
create new advisory committees if “compelling considerations” so require.
Termination and Limitation of Federal Advisory Committees, Exec. Order No.
12,838, 58 Fed. Reg. 8207 (Feb. 12, 1993). Further, Executive Order 12,838’s
implementing directive, Office of Management and Budget Circular A-135,
“Management of Federal Advisory Committees,” instructs federal agencies to cap the
number of advisory committees that each agency is allowed to maintain. U.S. O.M.B.,
Circular No. A-135, Management of Federal Advisory Committees (Oct. 5, 1994),
Whitehouse.gov, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a135. The BLM has
also promulgated regulations instructing the formation and implementation of FACs.
43 C.F.R. §§ 1784.0-1 to 1784.6-2.
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of providing “advice or recommendations” to the President or an agency.
Once established, FACA requires that FACs:241
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

establish a written charter that explains the mission of the
committee;242
give timely notice of the committee meeting in the Federal
Register;243
have fair and balanced membership on the committee;244
open committee meetings to the public, whenever
possible;245
have the sponsoring agency prepare minutes of the
committee meetings;246
provide public access to the information used by the
committee;247
grant the federal government the authority to convene and
adjourn the meetings;248 and
terminate within two years unless the committee is
renewed or otherwise provided for by statute.249

In their article “Chilling Collaboration: the Federal Advisory
Committee Act and Stakeholder Involvement in Environmental
241.
This list is reproduced from one contained in the following:
Thomas C. Beierle & Rebecca J. Long, Chilling Collaboration: The Federal Advisory
Committee Act and Stakeholder Involvement in Environmental Decisionmaking, 29
ENVT. L. REP., 10,399, 10,402 (1999).
242
U.S. General Services Administration, Federal Advisory Commi
ttee Charters (2017), available at: https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/
federal-advisory-committee-management/advice-and-guidance/federal-advisorycommittee-charters (each advisory committee prepares and files a formal charter,
accessible at https://www.facadatabase.gov, before the agency can meet or take any
action).
243.
5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(2).
244.
Id. at § 5(c).
245.
Id. at § 10(a)(1).
246.
Id. at § 10(c).
247.
Id. at § 5.
248.
Id. at § 10(f).
249.
Id. at §14(b).
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Decisionmaking”, Thomas C. Beierle and Rebecca J. Long discuss that
while FACA’s requirements appear innocuous, they actually directly and
indirectly discourage the use of collaborative processes and have become
a significant barrier to stakeholder efforts.250 Beierle and Long offer three
chilling effects FACA has on collaborative decision making: (1) the “law’s
procedural barriers that deter public groups from forming FACA-charter
committees;” (2) “administrative requirements that discourage agencies
from establishing FACA chartered committees;” and (3) “ambiguity about
the law’s requirements that creates fear among agencies of any type of
collaboration, or even consultation, with entities not chartered under
FACA.”251 Discouragingly, they note that “taken together, these elements
mean that, on the one hand, agencies and the public are discouraged from
chartering advisory committees under FACA, while, on the other hand,
government personnel are reluctant to collaborate or meet with
stakeholders unless they are chartered as a FACA committee.”252 They
suggest that while “FACA-phobia” has its origins in law, it is also a
behavioral phenomenon within agencies who have become too fearful of
FACA and should be encouraged to be more bold.253 Their rationale for
suggesting this is that punishment for violating FACA has not been that
bad.254 Moreover, if agencies comply with the spirit and intent of FACA
by conducting open and fair processes, there are likely no interests willing
to bring a suit against the agency on FACA grounds.255 Further, even if
aggrieved parties bring a suit, agencies are more likely to receive a
favorable ruling by the courts because of the process used.256

250.
Beierle & Long, supra note 241, at 10,403.
251.
Id. 10,402–405.
252.
Id. 10,403.
253.
Id. at 10,410.
254.
Id.
255.
Id.
256.
Id. referencing Steven P. Croley, Practical Guidance on the
Applicability of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 10 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U., 111,
176 (1996).
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A. FACA Safe Cooperation; Four Options
An agency's ability to incorporate collaboration in the NEPA
process is certainly limited by FACA.257 In seeking to increase
collaboration through a NEPA process, a federal agency cannot convene a
group of stakeholders seeking to solicit their advice and recommendations
without considering FACA’s requirements. However, FACA does not
prohibit agencies from collaborating.258 Federal agencies can still include
more collaboration into their NEPA processes (iNEPA or traditional)
while still complying with FACA.259 In an effort to encourage BLM
employees to be less FACA-phobic, the BLM published a document in
May 2005 entitled “Bureau of Land Management National Policy the
Federal Advisory Committee Act: What BLM Staff Need to Know When
Working with ADR-Based Collaborative Community Working
Groups.”260 In the document they acknowledge that when FACA was
signed into law, collaborative community working groups were clearly not
contemplated as these types of groups are a relatively new development in
agency efforts.261 While noting that collaborative efforts may likely
trigger FACA, the guidance suggests that collaborative efforts can be
designed and used in ways that do not trigger FACA.262
In fact, there are four ways to include collaboration into a NEPA
process to achieve a social license to operate while maintaining
compliance with FACA: (1) create a FAC in accordance with FACA and
other applicable regulations; (2) convene open meetings where no
collective advice or recommendations are offered by a group (individuals
advice or recommendations are ok); (3) limit participation of a group to
government entities only; or (4) have a non-federal organization convene
and administer the consensus seeking group, with the federal agency
participating as a fellow stakeholder in a technical resource capacity while
retaining their federal decision-making capacity.263
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Benson, supra note 239, at 10970.
Iterative NEPA and Collaboration, supra note 202, at 12.
Id.
U.S. BLM, supra note 238.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 13.
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The major limitation of the first option is federal agency’s
reluctance given the onerous rules involved with compliance with FACA.
In her article “Integrating Adaptive Management and Oil and Gas
Development: Existing Obstacles and Opportunities for Reform,” Melinda
Harm Benson discusses FACA as an obstacle to public involvement and
adaptive management efforts related to federal public land oil and gas
development projects.264 She provides an example suing the Pinedale
Anticline Working Group, a group of stakeholders tasked under the
Pinedale Anticline Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Project
Record of Decision, responsible for assisting the BLM in establishing and
implementing an adaptive management for the Pinedale Anticline.265 The
group waited two years for the establishment of a FAC and in the wait lost
its momentum and its ability to keep pace with the oil and gas
development.266 Benson notes that “while enacted with the best intentions,
FACA has actually paved the way for restricted public involvement”
because “the reality is that within federal agencies, FACA’s requirements
are viewed as onerous, and fear of running afoul of FACA’s requirements
is often used as an excuse to avoid engaging those outside government.”267
She references a 1998 Government Accountability Office survey of
federal agencies that found many instances where federal agencies decided
not to obtain outside input because of fear of compliance with FACA.268
It is also important to point out that even if a FAC is requested
there is no guarantee it will be approved by agency officials as the total
number of FACs are limited. Executive Order 12,838, signed by President
Clinton in 1993, instructs federal agencies to reduce their reliance upon
advisory committees by up to a third and to create new advisory
committees only if “compelling considerations” so require.269
Furthermore, the Office of Management and Budget’s implementation of
264.
Benson, supra note 239, at 10,970.
265.
Id.
266.
Id. at 10,967, 10,970.
267.
Id. at 10,970.
268.
Id. (citing U.S. GAO, Federal Advisory Committee Act: Views of
Committee Members and Agencies on Federal Advisory Committee Issues 5 (July 9,
1998)).
269.
Termination and Limitation of Federal Advisory Committees,
Exec. Order No. 12,838, 58 Fed. Reg. 8207 (Feb. 12, 1993).

250

PUBLIC LANDS & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol.39

the Executive Order instructs federal agencies to cap the number of
advisory committees that each agency is allowed to maintain.270
While the requirements of FACA may make it too difficult in
some instances for federal agencies to form a FAC, that is likely not the
case in all instances. This is particularly true for major oil and gas projects
where the volume of oil and gas resources measured against the
environmental and social issues to overcome compel the use of a
formalized collaborative process to achieve a social license. In those
instances, the time and effort required to initiate a FAC may be worth the
effort. The bottom line under option one is: if a federal agency chooses to
create an official FAC in order to incorporate stakeholder collaboration
into a NEPA process, it should be a strategic decision made well in
advance to secure sufficient time to officially establish and charter the
FAC.
Under the second option, a federal agency can convene a
collaborative process by hosting a series of meetings that are open to all.271
At the meetings, issues, interests, options, and final solutions are
deliberated with the agency so long as the group does not render specific
advice or recommendations to the agency as a group, whether by
consensus majority or otherwise.272 Instead, to avoid triggering FACA,
the group should provide only information, while individual members of
that group can provide specific recommendations and advice.273 Under
this option, meetings should be well publicized and membership remain
open to all.
The third option involves the federal agency convening a
collaborative group, limiting members of the group to government
270.
OMB, Circular No. A-135, Management of Federal Advisory
Committees (Oct. 5, 1994), available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars
_a135. It has been suggested that Exec. Order 12,838 may, in fact, be in tension with
the goal to promote more consensus-based decision-making, as any consensus-based
decision-making initiatives may well trigger FACA and therefore require the creation
of an advisory committee. Croley & Funk, supra note 236. This tension has been
described as classic tension of government involving “principals favoring openness,
participation, and accountability, on one hand, and those favoring administrative
speed, efficiency, and sure-footedness, on the other.” Id.
271.
U.S. BLM, supra note 238, at 4.
272.
Id.
273.
Id.
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officials only. If the collaborative group includes participants that are
solely federal, tribal, state and local government employees operating in
their official capacities, then the group is exempt from the requirements of
FACA.274
The final option is to have a non-federal organization convene and
organize the consensus seeking group, with the federal agency
participating as a fellow stakeholder while retaining their federal decisionmaking capacity. The non-federal convener could be the operator, as long
as a third-party neutral designs and leads the collaborative process. The
key point here is that the federal agency must not establish, manage, or
control the group; instead, the agency’s role should be limited to that of a
group participant.275
In conclusion, while FACA is a significant limitation on an
agency’s procedural discretionary authority to incorporate more
collaboration into the NEPA process toward achieving a social license,
agencies are not without options. Agencies can either strategically comply
with the requirements of FACA if appropriate, or they can avoid the
burdens of FACA by convening non-advice offering groups, hosting
collaborative groups of government officials only, or by having a thirdparty organization convene and organize a collaborative consensus
seeking group. Ultimately, the benefits obtained by achieving a social
license, specifically reducing the likelihood of litigation-drive delay,
outweigh the burdens of complying with FACA.
VI. CONCLUSION
In recognition that oil and gas projects go undeveloped “not for
lack of a legal license, but for lack of growing, earning and maintaining a
social license,”276 U.S. oil and gas companies are increasingly employing
social license efforts. Unfortunately, those efforts have not been as readily
applied to oil and gas projects located on federal public lands. In order to
274.
Id. at 3.
275.
Id. at 4.
276.
Smith & Richards, supra note 46, at 117, citing an article including
an audio interview with Alex Hohmann, Stakeholder Relations Manager for Anadarko
Petroleum. Stephanie Joyce, Relationships 101: Oil and Gas Looks for a
Social License to Operate, InsideEnergy.org, https://insideenergy.org/2014/12/05/
relationships-101-oil-and-gas-look-for-a-social-license- to-operate/ (Dec. 5, 2014).
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reduce conflict and avoid costly delays associated with litigation of public
land oil and gas development projects, oil and gas operators should employ
efforts to obtain a social license from the communities adjacent to the
development and from other stakeholders.
As demonstrated, achieving a social license to operate, which
involves a significant degree of meaningful dialogue between the energy
company and the community, is in essence a collaborative process. By
encouraging federal agencies to capitalize on recent efforts to include
more collaboration into the NEPA process (specifically through the
iterative NEPA or iNEPA), oil and gas companies can use the NEPA
process to achieve a social license to operate. In doing so, oil and gas
companies and agency personnel should be aware of the limitations
incorporating more collaboration into the NEPA process imposed by
FACA. However, the FACA limitations are not insurmountable, and we
have offered four options to incorporate more collaboration into the NEPA
process that are “FACA safe.”
Suggesting that federal agencies incorporate more collaboration
into the NEPA process in order to enable project proponents to achieve a
social license is certainly not limited to oil and gas operators. It is
applicable to all federal land project proponents who anticipate
community and/or stakeholder opposition to their projects including coal,
renewables, and timber. By encouraging federal agencies to incorporate
more collaboration into a NEPA process, federal land project proponents
can utilize the legal license process to achieve a social license to operate.

